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Congestion games have become a major issue of study for the interplay be-
tween game theory and computer science, and are widely discussed in the
multi-agent systems and the electronic commerce literature. In a classical con-
gestion game, as deﬁned by Rosenthal (1973), there exists a set of n players
and a set of m resources. A strategy for a player is associated with a subset
of the resources. In general, each player has his own set of possible strategies.
Notice that a strategy is associated with a subset of the resources and not
with a particular resource. Each resource is associated with a resource utility
function, which determines the utility of a player who selected this resource as
a function of the number of players using it. Given a strategy proﬁle, a single
strategy for each player, it determines the number of players who will be using
each resource. The payoﬀ for a player will be the sum of his utilities from the
resources he has selected. In many cases the term ”resource utility function”
is replaced by the term ”resource cost function”, to reﬂect the nature of the
particular application; the deﬁnition however remains as the one discussed
above. In many applications discussed in the literature the resource utility
function is decreasing as a function of the number of users (or, the resource
cost function is increasing). This may reﬂect situations where a resource is
a service provider whose costs per user are increasing due to competition on
internal resources. In other applications, such as cost sharing, the resource
cost functions are decreasing, reﬂecting cooperation among the users.
Consider the application of congestion games to a service industry. Let us
assume that each resource is a law ﬁrm. A client pays the ﬁrm on an hourly
basis. The law ﬁrm employs many lawyers that have access to a small number
of shared resources (starting from local printers, and ending up with sources
of information). When a client arrives he is assigned to a particular lawyer,
where each lawyer can handle only a ﬁxed small capacity of clients. Hence,
when clients arrive the lawyers ﬁnd themselves competing on a set of available
resources, the time spent per client increases as a function of the number of
clients of the ﬁrm, and the cost per client is monotonically increasing in the
number of clients. Needles to say, this situation is typical to many canonical
examples in the service industry, such as law ﬁrms, accounting ﬁrms, and
private detective agencies.
Consider now congestion games as discussed above with the following addition.
Assume that each resource may fail with probability f, where this probability
may depend on the number of players who have selected it: the more players
have selected this resource the higher the probability it will fail to deliver.
Player i which has a set of available strategies Σi (recall that each strategy
is a subset of the resources), is paid an additional utility vi if at least one
of the resources in his selected strategy, σi ∈ Σi, does not fail. Obviously,
this deﬁnes a strict extension of congestion games; classical congestion games
2are obtained when selecting f = 1 or vi = 0 for every player. In this paper
we consider a restriction on this strict generalization of congestion games: all
resources are taken to be identical, and all possible subsets of resources are
available as possible strategies for each player. We call this model ”Congestion
Games with Load Dependent Failures” [CGLFs] 1 .
Let us now return to the motivation behind CGLFs. Recall the application
of congestion games to the service industries, and consider for example the
situation in the private detective agencies sector. In this case, a typical client
may approach several private detective agencies, and will be charged by all;
moreover, typically, the client is interested in the veriﬁcation of a particular
question, and will beneﬁt as long as at least one of the agencies is able to deliver
the answer; needless to say, delivery by an agency may fail, and may depend
on the number of clients served by the agency. Such situations ﬁt squarely into
the CGLF setting. Of course, one may wish to re-visit the model, and consider
various possible modiﬁcations; CGLFs however are the ﬁrst attempt to handle
such fundamental issues. The reader should be careful about the use of the
term ”resource”; in the service industry examples each resource is a ﬁrm in
the formal model; the fact that resource cost functions may be increasing is a
result of the competition on internal resources within the ﬁrm, which are not
part of the model.
In a CGLF, the resource cost function may be increasing as in the service
industry example, or decreasing. The latter typically reﬂects situations when
there is price reduction due to economy of scale (for example, when the re-
sources in the game represent buyer clubs which enable users to share their
costs). An important modeling issue is whether costs are incurred by resources
which fail to deliver; that is, would one need to pay for the service regardless
of whether a success has been declared, or only in the case of success. Indeed,
both options are reasonable. For simplicity, we will assume one of the options,
and later discuss the other one. Both options lead to similar results.
In a previous paper we discussed the model of ”Congestion Games with Fail-
ures” [CGFs] (Penn et al., 2005). Although the terms CGF and CGLF may
sound similar, these models refer to very diﬀerent classes of situations. In a
CGF players care about the delay caused by using a set of alternative re-
sources, and therefore the payoﬀ of a player is determined by the minimum
of delays of the set of selected resources (and by incompletion costs). Notice
that this model does not deﬁne an extension of congestion games since it does
not consider the additvity of costs across selected resources. Therefore, CGFs
are an interesting model that model very diﬀerent situations than CGLFs,
1 Although one may wish to denote general congestion games with load-dependent
failure by CGLFs, and use a diﬀerent notation for the special case of identical
resources, for simplicity of exposition we have chosen to use CGLF for the special
case of identical resources studied in this paper.
3have very diﬀerent motivation, and do not refer to an extension of conges-
tion games. Indeed, the proof techniques discussed for CGFs and CGLFs are
completely diﬀerent. In fact, if we take the probability of failure to be a con-
stant, as is done in CGFs, then CGLFs will possess a potential function and
therefore can be viewed as congestion games (Monderer and Shapley, 1996).
While this is a technical observation, the major diﬀerences stem from the fun-
damentally diﬀerent assumptions discussed above. It is also worth noticing
that CGLFs should not be viewed as an extension of simple network games,
where the network is a set of parallel identical links. They indeed refer to a
strict extension of congestion games, although our study deals only with the
identical-resources complete strategy spaces version.
In this paper we introduce CGLFs and show that:
￿ CGLFs and, in particular, CGLFs with nondecreasing cost functions, do
not always admit a potential function. Therefore, they are not isomorphic
to congestion games. Nevertheless, if the failure probabilities are constant
(do not depend on the congestion) then a potential function is guaranteed
to exist.
￿ CGLFs and, in particular, CGLFs with decreasing cost functions, do not
always possess pure strategy Nash equilibria. However, as we show in our
main result, there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in any CGLF with
nondecreasing cost functions. Moreover, we present an eﬃcient algorithm for
constructing such an equilibrium in any given CGLF with nondecreasing
costs. The time complexity of our algorithm is O(n2m+nm2), where n and
m represent the number of players and resources, respectively.
While the work on CGFs is the most related to our current study, our work
can be viewed as part of the literature extending upon congestion games.
In particular, Leyton-Brown and Tennenholtz (2003) extended the class of
(simple) congestion games to the class of local-eﬀect games. Note that in simple
congestion games, the strategy set of each player consists of singleton sets. In
a local-eﬀect game, each player’s payoﬀ is eﬀected not only by the number
of players who have chosen the same resources as he has chosen, but also
by the number of players who have chosen neighboring resources (in a given
graph structure). The authors (Leyton-Brown and Tennenholtz, 2003) showed
both theoretically and empirically that these games often (but not always)
have pure strategy Nash equilibria. Congestion games were also generalized to
weighted congestion games in which each player has a weight, and the cost of
the resource depends on the total weight of players. These games do not possess
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (Fotakis et al., 2005). However, they have a
pure equilibrium in the case of simple games, in which the strategy set of every
player is a singleton set, with nondecreasing cost functions (Even-Dar et al.,
2003). Monderer (2007) dealt with another generalization of congestion games,
in which the resource cost functions are not universal but player-speciﬁc – PS-
congestion games. He deﬁned PS-congestion games of type q – q-congestion
4games, where q is a positive number, and showed that every game in strategic
form is a q-congestion game for some q. Perhaps the most known extension of
congestion games is Milchtaich’s work on player-speciﬁc resource cost functions
(Milchtaich, 1996). Milchtaich showed that simple and strategy-symmetric PS-
congestion games with nondecreasing cost functions do not admit a potential
function, but always possess a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Recall that
CGLFs are not simple congestion games, nor an extension of simple congestion
games; indeed, the complexity of the analysis of CGLFs stems from the ability
to select several resources.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we deﬁne our
model. In Sections 3 – 5 we present our results. In 3 we show that CGLFs,
in general, do not have pure strategy Nash equilibria. In 4 and 5 we focus on
CGLFs with nondecreasing cost functions (nondecreasing CGLFs). We show
that these games do not admit a potential function. However, in our main
results we prove the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in non-
decreasing CGLFs, and present an eﬃcient algorithm for computing such an
equilibrium. In Section 6 we consider a modiﬁed model of CGLFs in which
the players are required to pay only for non-faulty resources they use. Section
7 presents a short summary and discussion of future research.
2 The model
We consider a ﬁnite set of players where each player has a task that can be
carried out by any element of a set of identical resources (service providers).
Each player simultaneously chooses a subset of the resources in order to per-
form his task, and his aim is to maximize his own expected payoﬀ, as described
in the sequel.
Let N = {1,...,n} be a set of n players and let M = {e1,...,em} be a set of m
resources. Each resource is associated with a cost and a failure probability, each
of which depends on the number of players who use this resource. We assume
that the failure probability of a resource e ∈ M is a monotone nondecreasing
function f : {1,...,n} → [0,1) of the congestion experienced by e, and that
the failure or success of a particular resource is independent of the failure or
success of other resources. The cost of utilizing resource e ∈ M is a nonnegative
function c : {1,...,n} → R+ of the congestion on e.
Player i ∈ N chooses a strategy σi ∈ Σi which is a (possibly empty) subset of
the resources. That is, Σi is the power set of the set of resources: Σi = P(M).
Given a subset S ⊆ N of the players, the set of strategy combinations of the
members of S is denoted by ΣS = ×i∈SΣi, and the set of strategy combinations
of the complement subset of players is denoted by Σ−S (Σ−S = ΣN S =
×i∈N SΣi). The set of pure strategy proﬁles of all the players is denoted by
Σ (Σ = ΣN). Let σ = (σ1,...,σn) ∈ Σ be a pure strategy proﬁle. The (m-
5dimensional) congestion vector that corresponds to σ is h(σ) = (he(σ))e∈M,
where he(σ) =
   
 {i ∈ N : e ∈ σi}
   
 .
The outcome for player i ∈ N is denoted by xi ∈ {S,F}, where S and F,
respectively, indicate whether the task execution succeeded or failed. We say
that the execution of player i’s task succeeds if the task of player i is success-
fully completed by at least one of the resources chosen by him. The execution
of the player i’s task fails if none of the i’s selected resources completes it
successfully. The beneﬁt of player i from his outcome xi is denoted by Vi(xi),
where Vi(S) = vi, a given (nonnegative) value, and Vi(F) = 0. W.l.o.g., we
assume that the players’ beneﬁt values are given in descending order, i.e.
v1 ≥ v2 ≥ ... ≥ vn.
The utility of player i from a strategy proﬁle σ and his outcome xi, ui(σ,xi),
is the diﬀerence between his beneﬁt from the outcome, Vi(xi), and the sum of
the costs of the resources he has used:
ui(σ,xi) = Vi(xi) −
 
e∈σi
c(he(σ)).
The expected utility of player i from the strategy proﬁle σ, Ui(σ), is therefore,
Ui(σ) =
 
1 −
 
e∈σi
f(he(σ))
 
vi −
 
e∈σi
c(he(σ)),
where 1−
 
e∈σi f(he(σ)) denotes the probability of a successful completion of
player i’s task. We use the convention that
 
e∈∅f(he(σ)) = 1. Hence, if player
i chooses an empty set σi = ∅ (does not assign his task to any resource), then
his expected utility, Ui(∅,σ−i), equals zero.
Remark 1 In the above model, a player is required to pay for any resource he
uses, regardless of its success or failure. Such a scenario, for example, may take
place when the success or the failure of every resource cannot be observed, and
only the success or the failure of the player’s task can be detected. In Section
6 of this paper we extend our model to deal with observable resources, where
the players are required to pay only for the non-faulty resources they selected.
3 CGLFs with no pure strategy Nash equilibrium
We start by showing that the class of CGLFs, and in particular the subclass
of CGLFs with decreasing cost functions, does not in general possess Nash
equilibria in pure strategies.
Consider a CGLF with two players N = {1,2} and two resources M = {e1,e2}.
The cost function of each resource is given by c(1) = 1 and c(2) = 1
4 and the
failure probabilities are f(1) = 0.01 and f(2) = 0.26. The beneﬁts for the
6players from a successful task completion are v1 = 1.1 and v2 = 4. In Figure
1 we present the payoﬀ matrix of the game. By exploring Figure 1, it can be
Player 2
Player 1
∅ {e1} {e2} {e1,e2}
∅ U1 = 0 U1 = 0 U1 = 0 U1 = 0
U2 = 0 U2 = 2.96 U2 = 2.96 U2 = 1.9996
{e1} U1 = 0.089 U1 = 0.564 U1 = 0.089 U1 = 0.564
U2 = 0 U2 = 2.71 U2 = 2.96 U2 = 2.7396
{e2} U1 = 0.089 U1 = 0.089 U1 = 0.564 U1 = 0.564
U2 = 0 U2 = 2.96 U2 = 2.71 U2 = 2.7396
{e1,e2} U1 = −0.90011 U1 = −0.15286 U1 = −0.15286 U1 = 0.52564
U2 = 0 U2 = 2.71 U2 = 2.71 U2 = 3.2296
Figure 1. Example for non-existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in CGLFs.
easily seen that for every pure strategy proﬁle σ in this game there exists a
player i and a strategy σ′
i ∈ Σi such that Ui(σ−i,σ′
i) > Ui(σ). That is, every
pure strategy proﬁle in this game is not in equilibrium.
The following two sections focus on the subclass of CGLFs with nondecreasing
cost functions (henceforth, nondecreasing CGLFs). Nondecreasing CGLFs do
not, in general, admit a potential function. Therefore, these games are not
congestion games. Nevertheless, we prove that all such games possess a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium and develop an eﬃcient algorithm for computing
such an equilibrium.
4 Potential functions
Monderer and Shapley (1996) introduced the notions of potential function and
potential game, where a potential game is deﬁned to be a game that possesses
a potential function. A potential function is a real-valued function over the
set of pure strategy proﬁles, with the property that the gain (or loss) of a
player shifting to another strategy while the other players’ strategies are kept
unchanged, equals to the corresponding increment of the potential function.
The authors (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) showed that the classes of ﬁnite
potential games and congestion games coincide.
Here we show that the class of CGLFs, and in particular the subclass of
nondecreasing CGLFs, does not admit a potential function, and therefore is
not included in the class of congestion games. However, for the special case
of constant failure probabilities, a potential function is guaranteed to exist.
To prove these statements we use the following characterization of potential
games (Monderer and Shapley, 1996).
A path in Σ is a sequence τ = (σ0 → σ1 →    ) of strategy proﬁles such that for
every k ≥ 1 there exists a unique player, say player i, such that σk = (σ
k−1
−i ,σ′
i)
7for some σ′
i  = σ
k−1
i in Σi. A ﬁnite path τ = (σ0 → σ1 →     → σK) is closed
if σ0 = σK. It is a simple closed path if in addition σl  = σk for every 0 ≤ l  =
k ≤ K − 1. The length of a simple closed path is deﬁned to be the number of
distinct points in it; that is, the length of τ = (σ0 → σ1 →     → σK) is K.
Theorem 2 (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) Let G be a game in strategic
form with a vector U = (U1,...,Un) of utility functions. For a ﬁnite path
τ = (σ0 → σ1 →     → σK), let U(τ) =
 K
k=1[Uik(σk) − Uik(σk−1)], where ik
is the unique deviator at step k. Then, G is a potential game if and only if
U(τ) = 0 for every simple closed path τ of length 4.
4.1 Constant Failure Probabilities
Based on Theorem 2, we show below that CGLFs with constant failure prob-
abilities always possess a potential function.
Theorem 3 CGLFs with constant failure probabilities are potential games.
Proof: Assume we are given a game G with constant failure probabilities. Let
τ = (α → β → γ → δ → α) be an arbitrary simple closed path of length 4.
Let i and j denote the active players (deviators) in τ and z ∈ Σ−{i,j} be a
ﬁxed strategy proﬁle of the other players. Let α = (xi,xj,z), β = (yi,xj,z),
γ = (yi,yj,z), δ = (xi,yj,z), where xi,yi ∈ Σi and xj,yj ∈ Σj. Then,
U(τ) = Ui(xi,xj,z) − Ui(yi,xj,z) + Uj(yi,xj,z) − Uj(yi,yj,z)
+ Ui(yi,yj,z) − Ui(xi,yj,z) + Uj(xi,yj,z) − Uj(xi,xj,z)
=
 
1 − f
|xi|
 
vi −
 
e∈xi
c(h
(xi,xj,z)
e ) − ... −
 
1 − f
|xj|
 
vj +
 
e∈xj
c(h
(xi,xj,z)
e )
=
 
 
1 − f
|xi|
 
vi−...−
 
1 − f
|xj|
 
vj
 
−
 
 
e∈xi
c(h
(xi,xj,z)
e )−...−
 
e∈xj
c(h
(xi,xj,z)
e )
 
.
Notice that
  
1 − f|xi|
 
vi − ... −
 
1 − f|xj|
 
vj
 
= 0, as a sum of a telescope
series. The remaining sum equals 0, by applying Theorem 2 to congestion
games, which are known to possess a potential function. Thus, by Theorem 2,
G is a potential game. ￿
Remark 4 We note that the existence of a potential function holds also for
more general settings of games with constant failure probabilities. For in-
stance, for non-identical resources having diﬀerent failure probabilities and
cost functions and general cost functions (not necessarily monotone and/or
nonnegative). This follows from the fact that if the failure probabilities are
constant, then the expected beneﬁt (revenue) of each player does not depend
on the choices of the other players. In addition, for each player, the sum of the
costs over his chosen subset of resources, equals the payoﬀ of a player choosing
8the same strategy in the corresponding congestion game.
However, as presented in the next paragraph, if the failure probabilities are
not constant then even player- and resource-symmetric CGLFs do not admit
a potential function. As a result, the class of CGLFs is not isomorphic to the
class of congestion games.
4.2 Load-Dependent Failures
We show that no CGLF with n ≥ 2 players, m ≥ 2 resources and load-
dependent failure probabilities, in which the players’ beneﬁts from a success-
ful task completion are strictly positive and identical, is a potential game.
Note that since there is no potential function in player-symmetric CGLFs, its
absence is a result of the added features of the CGLF’s setting (namely, the re-
source failures) and not due to the player-speciﬁc utility functions. Moreover,
in some cases CGLFs with player-speciﬁc utilities may possess a potential
function.
Proposition 5 No CGLF with non-constant failures, n,m ≥ 2 and vi = v >
0 for all i ∈ N, possesses a potential function.
Proof: Let G be a player-symmetric CGLF with n,m ≥ 2 and vi = v > 0
for all i ∈ N. Let k ∈ {1,...,n− 1} be an arbitrary integer satisfying f(k) <
f(k + 1), 2 and let z ∈ Σ−{1,2} be a combination of the strategies of all the
players excluding players 1 and 2, satisfying hz
e1 = hz
e2 = k − 1. 3 Consider
the simple closed path of length 4 which is formed by α = (∅,{e2},z), β =
({e1},{e2},z), γ = ({e1},{e1,e2},z), δ = (∅,{e1,e2},z), where players 1 and
2 change their strategies, while the others play z. The expected utilities of the
deviators (players 1 and 2) on the path α → β → γ → δ → α are presented
in Figure 2. Exploring Figure 2 we get
Player 2
Player 1
{e2} {e1,e2}
∅ U1 = 0 U1 = 0
U2 = (1 − f(k))v − c(k) U2 =
 
1 − f(k)2 
v − 2c(k)
{e1} U1 = (1 − f(k))v − c(k) U1 = (1 − f(k + 1))v − c(k + 1)
U2 = (1 − f(k))v − c(k) U2 = (1 − f(k)f(k + 1))v − c(k) − c(k + 1)
Figure 2. The non-existence of a potential function in CGLFs.
U1(α) − U1(β) + U2(β) − U2(γ) + U1(γ) − U1(δ)
+U2(δ) − U2(α) = v(1 − f(k))(f(k) − f(k + 1)) < 0, (1)
2 If there is no such k then f is constant and, as has been shown in the previous
paragraph, a potential function is guaranteed to exist.
3 That is, e1 and e2 are chosen by exactly k −1 players, excluding players 1 and 2.
For instance, let k −1 players in N  {1,2} play {e1,e2} and all the others play ∅.
9which implies the non-existence of a potential function. ￿
As a result, CGLFs are not congestion games. Note that this result appears
to be independent of the resource cost functions (see (1)); therefore, it applies
in particular to the special cases of nondecreasing and constant costs.
5 Pure strategy Nash equilibria in nondecreasing CGLFs
Here we present our main results on CGLFs – the proof of existence and
eﬃcient construction of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in nondecreasing
CGLFs. In Section 6, to follow, we point out that similar results hold also for
the observable resource case.
5.1 Existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
Our existence proof is based on the idea of using some basic operations on
single resources (”A-, D- and S-moves”, referred to as ”single moves”, to be
deﬁned below) to reduce the size of the set of possible player deviations from
a given strategy proﬁle, that we need to examine. We prove that there exists a
”post-addition D-stable strategy proﬁle” (to be deﬁned in the sequel), and by
applying a series of single moves to it, we guarantee to reach an equilibrium.
5.1.1 Single moves and the single proﬁtable move property
The simplest deviations from a strategy proﬁle in a CGLF involve moves with
single resources, referred to as single moves.
Deﬁnition 6 For any strategy proﬁle σ ∈ Σ and for any player i ∈ N, the
operation of adding precisely one resource to his strategy, σi, is called an A-
move of i from σ. Similarly, the operation of dropping a single resource is
called a D-move, and the operation of switching one resource with another is
called an S-move.
Below we give intuitive and technical characterizations of single moves in
CGLFs, which we will make use of in our results. Let σ ∈ Σ, i ∈ N and a ∈ σi.
We say that a D-move with a is proﬁtable for i if Ui (σi   {a},σ−i) > Ui(σ).
That is,
vi

1 −
 
e∈σi {a}
f(he(σ))

−
 
e∈σi {a}
c(he(σ)) > vi
 
1 −
 
e∈σi
f(he(σ))
 
−
 
e∈σi
c(he(σ)),
10which is equivalent to
c(ha(σ)) > vi(1 − f(ha(σ)))
 
e∈σi {a}
f(he(σ)). (2)
Note that the right hand side in the above inequality stands for the expected
beneﬁt of player i from utilizing resource a at σ, if a is the only successful re-
source in his chosen set of resources. Clearly, if this value is less than c(ha(σ)),
the cost of using resource a at σ, then dropping a is a proﬁtable move for
player i. For simplicity of exposition, we use the following notation.
￿ For i ∈ N, a ∈ M and σ ∈ Σ, let va
i(σ) = vi(1−f(ha(σ)))
 
e∈σi {a} f(he(σ))
denote the marginal beneﬁt of i from a at σ. Note that due to the monotonic-
ity of f( ), va
i( ) (weakly) decreases with the congestion on a and increases
with the congestion on each of the other resources.
Using the above notation, (2) can be rewritten as c(ha(σ)) > va
i(σ). This
means that, relative to σ, it is proﬁtable for i to drop resource a if (and only
if) the cost of using a is greater than its marginal beneﬁt.
Similar inequalities can be derived also for A- and S-moves as follows. An
A-move from σ with resource b / ∈ σi is proﬁtable for i, i.e. Ui (σi ∪ {b},σ−i) >
Ui(σ), if and only if
vi(1 − f(hb(σ) + 1))
 
e∈σi
f(he(σ)) > c(hb(σ) + 1).
The above inequality indicates that the A-move with b is proﬁtable for i if
and only if the marginal beneﬁt from b at the resulting proﬁle, (σi ∪{b},σ−i),
is greater than its cost, i.e. vb
i(σi ∪ {b},σ−i) > c(hb(σ) + 1). In a similar way,
we conclude that an S-move from a ∈ σi to b / ∈ σi is proﬁtable for i if and
only if the marginal beneﬁt from switching from a to b is greater than the
corresponding diﬀerence of their costs, i.e. vb
i (σi ∪ {b}   {a},σ−i) − va
i(σ) >
c(hb(σ)+1)−c(ha(σ)). We also note that, due to the monotonicity of f( ) and
c( ), the above inequality holds if and only if hb(σ)+1 < ha(σ) and f( ) or c( )
strictly increases from hb(σ)+1 to ha(σ). We summarize the above discussion
in the following observation.
Observation 7 Let σ be a strategy proﬁle with a ∈ σi and b / ∈ σi for some
i ∈ N. Then,
(1) A D-move with a is proﬁtable for i if and only if c(ha(σ)) > va
i(σ).
(2) An A-move with b is proﬁtable for i if and only if vb
i(σi ∪ {b},σ−i) >
c(hb(σ) + 1).
(3) An S-move from a to b is proﬁtable for i if and only if hb(σ) + 1 < ha(σ)
and f( ) or c( ) strictly increases from hb(σ) + 1 to ha(σ).
The following lemma implies that any strategy proﬁle in which no player
wishes unilaterally to apply a single A-, D- or S-move, is a Nash equilibrium.
More precisely, we show that if there exists a player who beneﬁts from a
11unilateral deviation from a given strategy proﬁle, then there exists a single
A-, D- or S-move which is proﬁtable for him as well. This property is called
the single proﬁtable move property.
Lemma 8 (The single proﬁtable move property) Given a nondecreasing
CGLF, let σ ∈ Σ be a strategy proﬁle which is not in equilibrium, and let i ∈ N
be a player for which a proﬁtable deviation from σ is available. Then, i has a
proﬁtable A-, D- or S-move from σ.
The outline of the proof is as follows. Assume on the contrary that σ possesses
only non-single-move deviations. Each such deviation can be decomposed into
a series of single moves. Consider such a deviation, say σ′, with a decomposition
consisting of a minimal number of single moves. Inverting any of these single
moves is strictly non-proﬁtable with respect to σ′ (otherwise, it could have
been omitted from the original deviation to result a shorter sequence of single
moves). This, as we show below, implies that this move from σ was beneﬁcial
by itself. The formal proof is given below.
Proof: Let σ be a non-equilibrium strategy proﬁle and let i ∈ N be a player
who can beneﬁt from a unilateral deviation from σ. Let PDi(σ) denote the
set of all proﬁtable deviations of i from σ, that is
PDi(σ) = {xi ∈ Σi : Ui(σ−i,xi) > Ui(σ)}.
For any pair of sets A and B, let  (A,B) = max{|A   B|,|B   A|}. Clearly, if
player i deviates from strategy σi to strategy xi by applying a single A-, D- or
S-move, then  (xi,σi) = 1, and vice versa, if  (xi,σi) = 1 then xi is obtained
from σi by applying exactly one such move. Let yi ∈ argminxi∈PDi(σ)  (xi,σi),
and assume that  (yi,σi) > 1.
It is convenient to consider separately each of the following three cases: (i)
|yi σi| = 0, (ii) |σi  yi| = 0, and (iii) both |yi σi| and |σi  yi| are positive.
In the ﬁrst case (i), in which yi   σi, let a ∈ σi   yi, and consider the
strategy proﬁle y′
i = yi ∪ {a}, obtained by inverting the D-move with a from
σ. Clearly,  (y′
i,σi) = |σi   y′
i| < |σi   yi| =  (yi,σi). Hence, by the choice
of yi, Ui(y′
i,σ−i) < Ui(yi,σ−i), implying by Observation 7 that c(ha(σ)) >
va
i(y′
i,σ−i). Since yi   σi and a ∈ σi  yi then yi ⊆ σi  {a}, implying y′
i ⊆ σi.
Therefore, the above yields c(ha(σ)) > va
i(σ), implying by Observation 7 that
Ui(σi  {a},σ−i) > Ui(σ). That is, a single D-move with a from σ is proﬁtable
for player i.
In the second case (ii), in which σi   yi, let b ∈ yi   σi, and consider the
strategy proﬁle y′′
i = yi   {b}, obtained by inverting the A-move with b from
σ. Clearly,  (y′′
i ,σi) = |y′′
i   σi| < |yi   σi| =  (yi,σi). Hence, by the choice
of yi, Ui(σ−i,y′′
i ) < Ui(σ−i,yi), implying by Observation 7 that c(hb(σ)+1) <
vb
i(yi,σ−i). Since σi   yi and b ∈ yi   σi then σi ∪ {b} ⊆ yi. Therefore, the
above yields c(hb(σ)+1) < vb
i(σi∪{b},σ−i), implying Ui(σi∪{b},σ−i) > Ui(σ).
12That is, a single A-move with b from σ is proﬁtable for player i.
In the latter case (iii), both |yi   σi| and |σi   yi| are positive, hence let
a ∈ σi yi and b ∈ yi σi and consider the strategy proﬁle y′′′
i = yi {b}∪{a},
obtained by inverting the S-move from a to b. Clearly, |y′′′
i  σi| < |yi σi| and
|σi   y′′′
i | < |σi   yi|, yielding  (y′′′
i ,σi) <  (yi,σi). Hence, by the choice of yi,
Ui(σ−i,y′′′
i ) < Ui(σ−i,yi), implying by Observation 7 that hb(σ) + 1 < ha(σ)
and f( ) or c( ) strictly increases from hb(σ)+1 to ha(σ). This, in turn, yields
that Ui (σi   {a} ∪ {b},σ−i) > Ui(σ). That is, a single S-move from a to b is
proﬁtable for i. This completes the proof. ￿
5.1.2 Stability under single moves
Based on the single proﬁtable move property, in order to prove the existence
of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, it suﬃces to present a strategy proﬁle
for which no player wishes unilaterally to apply a single move. This motivates
the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 9 A strategy proﬁle σ is said to be A-stable (resp., D-stable,
S-stable) if there are no players with a proﬁtable A- (resp., D-, S-) move
from σ.
Our goal is to ﬁnd an A-, D- and S-stable strategy proﬁle, implying this proﬁle
is in equilibrium (by the single proﬁtable move property). To describe how we
achieve this, we deﬁne the notions of light and heavy resources as well as
even and nearly-even strategy proﬁles. These concepts play a central role in
the proof of our main results. In particular, we will show that the obtained
equilibrium is either an even or a nearly-even strategy proﬁle.
Deﬁnition 10 Given a strategy proﬁle σ, resource e′ is called σ-light if e′ ∈
argmine∈M he(σ) and σ-heavy otherwise. A strategy proﬁle σ with no heavy
resources will be termed even. An even strategy proﬁle with a common conges-
tion of k on the resources will be termed k-even. A strategy proﬁle σ satisfying
|he(σ) − he′(σ)| ≤ 1 for all e,e′ ∈ M will be termed nearly-even.
Obviously, every even strategy proﬁle is nearly-even. In addition, in a nearly-
even strategy proﬁle all heavy resources (if such exist) have the same conges-
tion. As is shown in the following lemma, this implies the S-stability of that
proﬁle.
Lemma 11 In a nondecreasing CGLF, every nearly-even strategy proﬁle is
S-stable.
Proof: Let σ be a proﬁle with a nearly even congestion on the resources.
Then, ha(σ) ≤ hb(σ) + 1 for any a,b ∈ M, implying by Observation 7 that
Ui(σ) ≥ Ui (σi   {a} ∪ {b},σ−i) for any i ∈ N with a ∈ σi and b / ∈ σi. Hence,
σ is S-stable. ￿
13One can easily check that the opposite direction holds whenever f( ) or c( )
is strictly increasing.
We observe that the proﬁle σ0 = (∅,...,∅) is D-stable and 0-even. Hence,
by Lemma 11, σ0 is D- and S-stable, termed DS-stable, and the subset of
even, DS-stable strategy proﬁles is not empty. Based on this observation, one
may hope to achieve a Nash equilibrium by applying a series of A-moves to
an even, DS-stable strategy proﬁle. The two types of A-moves (”one- and
two-step additions”) deﬁned below, keep the nearly-evenness property (and
therefore, the S-stability) if applied to a nearly-even strategy proﬁle. However,
as we show in the sequel, an A-move (and, in particular, a one- or two-step
addition), may destroy the D-stability of the newly obtained proﬁle and cause
a chain of D-moves by diﬀerent players, leading to a reduced congestion on
the resources. This implies that an A-move dynamics from an arbitrary initial
point does not guarantee the convergence to an equilibrium (see the discussion
after Lemma 14 in the sequel).
5.1.3 One- and two-step additions
Given a strategy proﬁle σ, for each player i ∈ N with σi   M let ei ∈
argmine∈M σi he(σ). That is, ei is a lightest resource not chosen previously by
i. Then,
Observation 12 If there exists a proﬁtable A-move for player i, then the A-
move with ei, a lightest resource not chosen previously by i, is proﬁtable for i
as well.
This is since if player i wishes to unilaterally add a resource, say a ∈ M   σi,
then by Observation 7 and the monotonicity of f( ) and c( ),
v
ei
i (σi ∪ {e
i},σ−i) ≥ v
a
i (σi ∪ {a},σ−i) > c(ha(σ) + 1) ≥ c(hei(σ) + 1).
If no player wishes to change his strategy in this manner, i.e. if Ui(σ) ≥
Ui(σi∪{ei},σ−i) for all i ∈ N, then by Observation 12, Ui(σ) ≥ Ui(σi∪{a},σ−i)
for all i ∈ N and a ∈ M   σi. Hence, σ is A-stable.
Deﬁnition 13 Assume σ is not A-stable and let N(σ) denote the subset of
all players for which there exists ei such that a unilateral addition of ei is
proﬁtable. Let a ∈ argminei:i∈N(σ) hei(σ) be such a resource of minimum con-
gestion. Let also i ∈ N(σ) be the player for which ei = a. If a is σ-light, then
let σ′ = (σi ∪ {a},σ−i). In this case we say that σ′ is obtained from σ by a
one-step addition of resource a, and a is called the added resource. If a is
σ-heavy then there exists a σ-light resource b and a player j such that a ∈ σj
and b / ∈ σj. Then let σ′ =
 
σi ∪ {a},σj   {a} ∪ {b},σ−{i,j}
 
. In this case we
say that σ′ is obtained from σ by a two-step addition of resource b, and b
is called the added resource.
14We notice that, in both cases, the congestion of each resource in σ′ is the
same as in σ, except for the added resource, for which its congestion in σ′
has increased by 1. Thus, if σ is nearly-even then σ′ is also nearly-even (since
the added resource is σ-light). Then, Lemma 11 implies the S-stability of
σ′. However, for D-stable strategy proﬁles, their D-stability after an addition
operation is not necessarily preserved (see Figure 3 below), and a (possibly
long) chain of D-moves may follow (such an example is presented at the end
of this paragraph). Nevertheless, as we show in Lemma 14 below, if σ is a
A-stable
S-stable
DS-stable
D-stable
A-move
Figure 3. Applying an A-move to a DS-stable proﬁle may destroy the D-stability.
D-stable and nearly-even strategy proﬁle then the only potential cause for an
in-D-stability of σ′, which is obtained from σ by a one- or two-step addition,
is the existence of a player who used the added resource before the addition
operation and wishes to drop it after it had been added by another player.
Lemma 14 Let σ be a nearly-even and D-stable strategy proﬁle of a given
nondecreasing CGLF, and let σ′ be obtained from σ by a one- or two-step
addition of resource a. Then, there are no proﬁtable D-moves for any player
i ∈ N with σ′
i  = σi. For i ∈ N with σ′
i = σi, the only possible proﬁtable D-move
(if exists) is to drop the added resource, a.
The outline of the proof is as follows. Note that the congestion on the re-
sources in σ′ are the same as in σ, expect for the added resource for which the
congestion has been increased by 1. Therefore, for players that play the same
strategy in both proﬁles the statement follows directly from the D-stability of
σ and the non-decreaseness of f( ) and c( ). As for the other players, the proof
uses the proﬁtability of the addition operation and Observation 7. Before we
present the formal proof, we need the following notation.
￿ For i ∈ N, a ∈ M and σ ∈ Σ, let ¯ va
i (σ) =
va
i (σ)
1−f(ha(σ)).
￿ For k = 1,...,n, let ¯ c(k) =
c(k)
1−f(k).
15Remark 15 Note that for any i ∈ N, a ∈ M and σ ∈ Σ, ¯ va
i(σ) is a non-
decreasing function of the congestion on each resource in σi   {a}, and ¯ c(k)
is a nondecreasing function of k (k = 1,...,n). Thus, the above notation
is technically more useful than that of va
i(σ) and c(k). In addition, through-
out this paper, the marginal beneﬁt function, v( ), and the cost function, c( ),
could have been equivalently replaced by ¯ v( ) and ¯ c( ), respectively. For exposi-
tion reasons though, we use the notions of cost and marginal beneﬁt whenever
possible, to keep the proofs more intuitive.
Now we are ready to present the proof of Lemma 14.
Proof: We prove the lemma for the one- and the two-step addition, separately.
One-step addition. Suppose σ′ is obtained from σ by a one-step addition of a
by player i, that is, σ′ = (σi ∪ {a},σ−i). Then, Ui(σ′) > Ui(σ) ⇒ Ui(σ′) >
Ui(σ′
i  {a},σ′
−i), i.e. dropping resource a is not a proﬁtable policy for i. This,
in turn, implies that the marginal beneﬁt of i from a at σ′ is greater than its
cost, i.e.
v
a
i(σ
′) > c(ha(σ
′)). (3)
Assume that there is a proﬁtable D-move for player i, that is, there exists a
resource b ∈ σ′
i   {a} such that Ui
 
σ′
i   {b},σ′
−i
 
> Ui(σ′), implying
c(hb(σ
′)) > v
b
i(σ
′). (4)
Since σ is nearly-even, ha(σ′) = ha(σ) + 1 and he(σ′) = he(σ) for all e ∈ M  
{a}, implying ha(σ′) ≥ hb(σ′). By the monotonicity of c( ), (3) and (4) yield
vb
i(σ′) < va
i (σ′), which, coupled with the monotonicity of f( ), implies ha(σ′) <
hb(σ′), a contradiction. Hence, no proﬁtable D-move from σ′ is available for i.
Let k  = i. Then, σ′
k = σk. We have to show that dropping any resource b  = a is
not proﬁtable for player k. Assume otherwise, i.e. Uk
 
σ′
k   {b},σ′
−k
 
> Uk(σ′).
Then,
c(hb(σ
′)) > v
b
k(σ
′
k). (5)
By the D-stability of σ,
c(hb(σ)) ≤ v
b
k(σk). (6)
Since hb(σ′) = hb(σ) and he(σ′) ≥ he(σ) for all e ∈ M, by the monotonicity of
f( ), (6) contradicts (5).
Two-step addition. Now suppose that σ′ is obtained by a two-step addition
of a. More precisely, let σ′ =
 
σi ∪ {b},σj   {b} ∪ {a},σ−{i,j}
 
, where b is
σ-heavy and a is σ-light. Then, Ui(σi ∪ {b},σ−i) > Ui(σ) implies
v
b
i(σi ∪ {b},σ−i) > c(hb(σ) + 1), (7)
or, equivalently, ¯ vb
i(σi ∪ {b},σ−i) > ¯ c(hb(σ) + 1). Now, since b is σ-heavy,
hb(σ′) = hb(σ) ≥ he(σ′) ≥ he(σ), for all e ∈ M. Hence, for all e′ ∈ σ′
i, (7) yields
16the following (note that he
 
σ′
j   {a},σ−j
 
= he
 
σi ∪ {b},σj   {b},σ−{i,j}
 
=
he(σ) for all e ∈ M):
¯ v
e′
i (σ
′) ≥ ¯ v
e′
i (σ
′
j   {a},σ
′
−j) = ¯ v
e′
i (σi ∪ {b},σj   {b},σ−{i,j})
≥ ¯ v
b
i(σi ∪ {b},σ−i) > ¯ c(hb(σ) + 1) ≥ ¯ c(he′(σ
′)),
which implies Ui(σ′) > Ui(σ′
i   {e′},σ′
−i) for all e′ ∈ σ′
i. That is, no proﬁtable
D-move from σ′ is available for i.
Consider now player j. We have to show that no proﬁtable D-move from σ′
is available for j. We demonstrate below that the required follows directly
from the D-stability of the original strategy proﬁle, σ. Namely, we show that
Uj(σ) ≥ Uj(σj  {e},σ−j) for all e ∈ σj implies Uj(σ′) ≥ Uj(σ′
j  {e′},σ′
−j) for
all e′ ∈ σ′
j.
Since b is σ-heavy, a is σ-light and σ is nearly-even, ha(σ′) = ha(σ)+1 = hb(σ).
Recall that b ∈ σj. Then, Uj(σ) ≥ Uj(σj   {b},σ−j) implies vb
i(σ) ≥ c(hb(σ))
⇒ va
i (σ′) ≥ c(ha(σ′)). Now, since ha(σ′) ≥ he(σ′) for all e ∈ M, the above
yields ve′
i (σ′) ≥ c(he′(σ′)), which implies Uj(σ′) ≥ Uj(σ′
−j,σ′
j   {e′}) for all
e′ ∈ σ′
j.
For any player k  = i,j, the proof we provided for the ﬁrst case, is valid here
as well. ￿
By Lemma 14, applying a one- or two-step addition operation to a nearly-
even 4 , D-stable strategy proﬁle, may only cause a D-move with the added
resource. However, even this seemingly simple in-D-stability may be hard to
ﬁx. As we show in the following example, a (possibly long) chain of D-moves
by diﬀerent players may follow after the ﬁrst D-move with the added resource.
Example 16 Consider a CGLF with 7 players N = {1,2,3,4,5,6,7} and 8
resources M = {e1,...,e8}. The cost function of each resource is given by
c(1) = 9, c(2) = 16, c(3) = c(4) = c(5) = c(6) = c(7) ≥ 16, and the failure
probabilities are f(1) = 0.1, f(2) = 0.2 and f(3) = f(4) = f(5) = f(6) =
f(7) ≥ 0.2. The beneﬁts for the players from a successful task completion are
v1 = 7500, v2 = 1500, v3 = v4 = v5 = v6 = 150, and v7 = 15. Consider the
strategy proﬁle σ in which σ1 = {e1,e2,e5}, σ2 = {e2,e3,e8}, σ3 = {e3,e4},
σ4 = {e4,e5}, σ5 = σ6 = {e6} and σ7 = {e7}:
e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 e7 e8
1 1 2 3 4 5 7 2
2 3 4 1 6
Note that he1(σ) = he7(σ) = he8(σ) = 1 and he2(σ) = he3(σ) = he4(σ) =
4 Recall that every nearly-even proﬁle is S-stable (see Lemma 11).
17he5(σ) = he6(σ) = 2; that is, σ is nearly-even and therefore S-stable (by Lemma
11). In addition, for any player i ∈ N and for any resource e ∈ σi, ¯ ve
i(σ) ≥
¯ c(he(σ)) 5 :
¯ v
e1
1 (σ) = 7500   0.2
2 = 300 > 150 = 7500   0.1   0.2 = ¯ v
e2
1 (σ) = ¯ v
e5
1 (σ) >
¯ c(he2(σ)) = ¯ c(he5(σ)) = ¯ c(2) =
16
1 − 0.2
= 20 > 10 =
9
1 − 0.1
= ¯ c(1) = ¯ c(he1(σ)),
¯ v
e8
2 (σ) = 1500   0.2
2 = 60 > 30 = 1500   0.1   0.2 = ¯ v
e2
2 (σ) = ¯ v
e3
2 (σ) >
¯ c(he2(σ)) = ¯ c(he3(σ)) = ¯ c(2) = 20 > 10 = ¯ c(1) = ¯ c(he8(σ)),
¯ v
e3
3 (σ) = ¯ v
e4
3 (σ) = 150   0.2 = 30 > 20 = ¯ c(2) = ¯ c(he3(σ)) = ¯ c(he4(σ)),
¯ v
e4
4 (σ) = ¯ v
e5
4 (σ) = 30 > 20 = ¯ c(2) = ¯ c(he4(σ)) = ¯ c(he5(σ)),
¯ v
e6
5 (σ) = 150 > 20 = ¯ c(2) = ¯ c(he6(σ)),
¯ v
e6
6 (σ) = 150 > 20 = ¯ c(2) = ¯ c(he6(σ)),
¯ v
e7
7 (σ) = 15 > 10 = ¯ c(1) = ¯ c(he7(σ)),
implying by Observation 7 the D-stability of σ. Thus, σ is a DS-stable proﬁle.
Now, since
¯ v
e7
1 (σ1 ∪ {e7},σ−1) = 7500   0.1   0.2
2 = 30 > 20 = ¯ c(2) = ¯ c(he7(σ) + 1),
it follows by Observation 7 that player 1 wishes to apply an A-move with
resource e7. Let σi = (σ1∪{e7},σ−1) (note that e7 is σ-light, i.e. σi is obtained
from σ by the one-step addition of e7 by player 1) as presented below:
e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 e7 e8
1 1 2 3 4 5 7 2
2 3 4 1 6 1
Notice that the proﬁle σi is not D-stable, since player 7 wishes to apply a D-
move from the added resource, e7 (by 14, this is the only possible proﬁtable
D-move):
¯ v
e7
7 (σ
i) = 15 < 20 = ¯ c(2) = ¯ c(he7(σ
i)),
and let σii = (σ7   {e7},σ−7) :
e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 e7 e8
1 1 2 3 4 5 1 2
2 3 4 1 6
5 See the notation following Lemma 14.
18Observe that proﬁle σii is not D-stable as well, since player 1 wishes to drop
resource e2:
¯ v
e2
1 (σ
ii) = 7500   0.1
2   0.2 = 15 < 20 = ¯ c(2) = ¯ c(he2(σ
ii)),
and let σiii = (σ1   {e2},σ−1):
e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 e7 e8
1 2 2 3 4 5 1 2
3 4 1 6
Note that the moves of player 1 demonstrate the following chain of preferences:
utilizing 2 resources of congestion 2 and 1 of congestion 1 is preferred by using
3 resources of congestion 2 and 1 of congestion 1 (his A-move operation); now,
after the 7’s D-move, using 2 resources of congestion 2 and 2 of congestion 1
is preferred by using 2 resources of congestion 1 and 1 of congestion 2 (the 1’s
D-move).
Now observe that the D-move with e3 is proﬁtable for player 2:
¯ v
e3
2 (σ
iii) = 1500   0.1
2 = 15 < 20 = ¯ c(2) = ¯ c(he3(σ
iii)),
and let σiv = (σ2   {e3},σ−2):
e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 e7 e8
1 2 3 3 4 5 1 2
4 1 6
Player 3 now wishes to drop resource e4:
¯ v
e4
3 (σ
iv) = 150   0.1 = 15 < 20 = ¯ c(2) = ¯ c(he4(σ
iv)),
and let σv = (σ3   {e4},σ−3):
e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 e7 e8
1 2 3 4 4 5 1 2
1 6
Proﬁle σv is also in-D-stable, since player 4 wishes to drop resource e5:
¯ v
e5
4 (σ
v) = 150   0.1 = 15 < 20 = ¯ c(2) = ¯ c(he5(σ
v)),
19and let σvi = (σ4   {e5},σ−4):
e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 e7 e8
1 2 3 4 1 5 1 2
6
Although the resulting proﬁle, σvi, is DS-stable (no more proﬁtable D-moves
are available), it is not a Nash equilibrium, since players 5 and 6 would now
beneﬁt from an A-move with any of the resources in M   {e6}, i.e.
¯ v
e
i(σ
vi) = 150   0.2 = 30 > 20 = ¯ c(2) = ¯ c(he(σ
vi))
for i = 5,6, e ∈ M   {e6}, and a new chain of moves will begin.
As one may learn from the above example, the addition of a resource a by
player i may force player j to drop the added resource, a. This, in turn, may
cause player i to drop another resource, say b. This is since the D-move of
j from a has decreased the failure probability of a; hence, the i’s marginal
beneﬁt from b has been decreased. Moreover, the modiﬁed marginal beneﬁt
from b might be smaller than its cost (clearly, b is σ-heavy; otherwise, the
addition of a would be non-proﬁtable for i). For the same reason, the D-
move of i from b may cause a chain of D-moves from other heavy resources
by diﬀerent players. Although the length of such a chain is bounded by m,
the number of resources, it is not clear whether the one-/two-step addition
dynamics converges to an equilibrium if it initializes with an arbitrary DS-
stable proﬁle. 6 This observation motivates us to look for a DS-stable proﬁle
that would remain DS-stable after applying to it a one- or two-step addition.
5.1.4 Post-addition D-stability
Based on Lemma 14, given a strategy proﬁle σ ∈ Σ, we say that σ is post-
addition D-stable if any strategy proﬁle σ′ obtained from σ by applying a one-
or two-step addition operation, does not admit proﬁtable D-moves with the
added resource. More precisely, using Observation 7, we deﬁne post-addition
D-stability as follows.
Deﬁnition 17 Let σ be a strategy proﬁle of a given nondecreasing CGLF. A
proﬁle σ will be termed post-addition D-stable if for every player i ∈ N
with |σi| > 0 and for every σ-light resource a ∈ σi,
¯ v
a
i(σ) ≥ ¯ c(ha(σ) + 1). (8)
6 However, we do not have examples for loops in such a dynamics, implying that
the question of the existence of an ordinal potential function (see (Monderer and
Shapley, 1996)) in CGLFs has not yet been resolved.
20Given a post-addition D-stable strategy proﬁle σ, let σ′ be obtained from σ
by applying a one- or two-step addition of a σ-light resource a by one of the
players (note that σ′ is nearly-even whenever σ is nearly-even). Then, for any
player i with a ∈ σi, (8) is essentially equivalent to the non-proﬁtability of a
D-move with a from σ′ (since ¯ va
i (σ′) = ¯ va
i(σ) and ¯ c(ha(σ′)) = ¯ c(ha(σ) + 1)).
Then, Lemma 14 implies the D-stability of σ′ whenever σ is nearly-even and
D-stable. We also notice that any nearly-even, post-addition D-stable strategy
proﬁle is D-stable. Therefore, if σ is post-addition D-stable and nearly-even
then σ′ is D-stable and nearly-even.
At this point, two questions arise.
￿ First, is a nearly-even, post-addition D-stable strategy proﬁle guaranteed to
exist in CGLFs?
￿ Second, would the existence of such a proﬁle guarantee the convergence to a
Nash equilibrium? Namely, could we preserve the post-addition D-stability
while applying one-/two-step addition operations sequentially? Would such
a dynamics reach an equilibrium in a reasonable number of steps (if ever)?
(See Figure 4 below.)
A-stable
D-stable
S-stable
Figure 4. Convergence of the one-/two-step addition dynamics to an equilibrium.
Lemmas 18 and 19 below, which are central to the proof of our main result,
provide aﬃrmative answers to the above questions. They show the existence
of an even, post-addition D-stable strategy proﬁle, and that applying to it a
polynomial series of one- and two-step addition operations leads to a Nash
equilibrium. Let us provide some notations ﬁrst.
￿ Let Σ0 ⊆ Σ denote the subset of all D-stable strategy proﬁles, and let
Σ1 ⊆ Σ0 be the subset of all even, D-stable strategy proﬁles. By Lemma 11,
every proﬁle in Σ1 (if such exists) is S-stable.
￿ For any even strategy proﬁle σ, let hσ denote the common congestion on
21the resources, 7 and let Σ2 ⊆ Σ1 be the subset of Σ1 consisting of all
those proﬁles with maximum congestion on the resources. That is, Σ2 =
argmaxσ∈Σ1 hσ.
Lemma 18 Given a nondecreasing CGLF, there exists a strategy proﬁle σ ∈
Σ2 that is either a pure strategy Nash equilibrium or post-addition D-stable.
Lemma 19 Given a nondecreasing CGLF, let σ be a nearly-even, post-addition
D-stable strategy proﬁle, and let σ′ be obtained from σ by applying to it a one-
or two-step addition operation. If mine∈M he(σ′) = mine∈M he(σ) then σ′ is
post-addition D-stable.
For exposition reasons, we leave the proofs of Lemmas 18 and 19 to the end
of this subsection.
Assume Σ2 does not contain an equilibrium proﬁle. Then, by Lemma 18, there
is a post-addition D-stable proﬁle σ′ that lies in Σ2. Furthermore, Lemma
19 implies the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium and that this
equilibrium can be achieved by applying sequentially less than m one- or two-
step addition operations to σ′. This is because otherwise, after m addition
operations we obtain an even, D-stable strategy proﬁle σ′′ with hσ′′
> hσ′
,
contradicting σ′ ∈ Σ2. Therefore, combining Lemmas 18 and 19 yields the
following theorem.
Theorem 20 Every nondecreasing CGLF possesses a Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies.
It is worthwhile mentioning that our existence proof is ”almost” algorith-
mic. Namely, in Lemma 18 we prove the existence of an even, post-addition
D-stable proﬁle, and point to a subset of proﬁles, Σ2, that contains such a pro-
ﬁle. Furthermore, Lemma 19 states that applying the one-/two-step addition
dynamics to that proﬁle will result in a Nash equilibrium proﬁle. Therefore,
to make the proof algorithmic, we only need to ﬁnd constructively a post-
addition D-stable proﬁle in Σ2. This goal is achieved by our CGLF-algorithm
presented in the sequel.
We turn now to prove Lemmas 18 and 19. To simplify the exposition of the
following proofs, we use the notations below.
￿ For i ∈ N, x ∈ {0,...,m} and k ∈ {1,...,n} let vk
i (x) = vif(k)x(1−f(k)).
Note that vk
i (x) denotes the marginal beneﬁt of i from using any of his x+1
chosen resources at a k-even strategy proﬁle. That is, vk
i (x) = va
i(σ) for any
k-even proﬁle σ with |σi| = x + 1, and a ∈ σi.
￿ For i ∈ N, x ∈ {0,...,m} and k ∈ {1,...,n}, let ¯ vk
i (x) =
vk
i (x)
(1−f(k)). Note
that ¯ vk
i (x) weakly increases in k (since f( ) is nondecreasing) and strictly
decreases in x (since f( ) < 1). Recall that ¯ c(k) =
c(k)
(1−f(k)) is a nondecreasing
7 That is, σ is hσ-even.
22function of k.
Proof of Lemma 18: If Σ2 includes a pure strategy Nash equilibrium strat-
egy proﬁle, we are done. Otherwise, let UN(σ) =
 
i∈N Ui(σ) denotes the
group utility of the players, and let Σ3 ⊆ Σ2 be the subset of all proﬁles in
Σ2 with maximum group utility. That is, Σ3 = argmaxσ∈Σ2
 
i∈N Ui(σ) =
argmaxσ∈Σ2 UN(σ). We show below that there exists a post-addition D-stable
strategy proﬁle in Σ3. That is, by Deﬁnition 17 and the above notation, we
show that there is σ ∈ Σ3 such that for all i ∈ N with |σi| > 0,
¯ v
hσ
i (|σi| − 1) ≥ ¯ c(h
σ + 1). (9)
If maxσ∈Σ1 hσ = 0 then, obviously, Σ1 = Σ2 = Σ3 = {σ0 = (∅,...,∅)} and
|σ0
i| = 0 for all i ∈ N. Hence, clearly, σ0 is post-addition D-stable. Now assume
that maxσ∈Σ1 hσ > 0. Let σ ∈ Σ3 and let M(σ) be the subset of all resources
for which there exists a player for whom adding the resource is proﬁtable.
First, we show that (9) holds for all i ∈ N such that σi ∩ M(σ)  = ∅, i.e. for
all those players with one of their resources being desired by another player.
Let a ∈ M(σ), and let σ′ be obtained from σ by the one-step addition of a by
player i. Assume there is a player, j, with a ∈ σj such that
¯ v
hσ
j (|σj| − 1) < ¯ c(h
σ + 1). (10)
Let σ′′ = (σ′
j  {a},σ′
−j). Below we demonstrate that σ′′ is a D-stable strategy
proﬁle and, since σ′′ and σ correspond to the same congestion vector, we
conclude that σ′′ lies in Σ2. In addition, we show that UN(σ′′) > UN(σ),
contradicting the fact that σ ∈ Σ3.
To show that σ′′ ∈ Σ0 we note that since hσ′′ = hσ and σ ∈ Σ0, there are no
proﬁtable D-moves for any player k  = i,j. It remains to show that there are
no proﬁtable D-moves for players i and j as well. Since Ui(σ′) > Ui(σ), by
Observation 7 we get
¯ v
hσ
i (|σi|) > ¯ c(h
σ + 1), (11)
which implies ¯ vhσ′′
i (|σ′′
i |−1) = ¯ vhσ
i (|σi|) > ¯ c(hσ+1) ≥ ¯ c(hσ) = ¯ c(hσ′′
), yielding
Ui(σ′′) > Ui(σ′′
i  {b},σ′′
−i) for all b ∈ σ′′
i . Thus, there are no proﬁtable D-moves
for player i. By the D-stability of σ, for player j and for all b ∈ σj we have
that ¯ vhσ
j (|σj|−1) ≥ ¯ c(hσ). Then, ¯ vhσ′′
j (|σ′′
j|−1) > ¯ vhσ′′
j (|σ′′
j|) = ¯ vhσ
j (|σj|−1) ≥
¯ c(hσ) = ¯ c(hσ′′
), implying Uj(σ′′) > Uj(σ′′
j   {b},σ′′
−j) for all b ∈ σj. Therefore,
σ′′ is D-stable and lies in Σ2.
To show that UN(σ′′), the group utility of σ′′, satisﬁes UN(σ′′) > UN(σ), we
note that hσ′′ = hσ, and thus Uk(σ′′) = Uk(σ), for all k ∈ N {i,j}. Therefore,
we have to show that Ui(σ′′) + Uj(σ′′) > Ui(σ) + Uj(σ) or, equivalently, that
Ui(σ′′) − Ui(σ) > Uj(σ) − Uj(σ′′). By (10) and (11), ¯ vhσ
i (|σi|) > ¯ vhσ
j (|σj| − 1),
which is equivalent to vhσ
i (|σi|) > vhσ
j (|σj| − 1). Thus,
23Ui(σ
′′) − Ui(σ)
=
 
1 − f(h
σ)
|σi|+1
 
vi − (|σi| + 1)c(h
σ) −
  
1 − f(h
σ)
|σi|
 
vi − |σi|c(h
σ)
 
=vif(h
σ)
|σi| (1 − f(h
σ)) − c(h
σ) = v
hσ
i (|σi|) − c(h
σ)
>v
hσ
j (|σj| − 1) − c(h
σ) = vjf(h
σ)
|σj|−1(1 − f(h
σ)) − c(h
σ)
=
 
1 − f(h
σ)
|σj|
 
vj − |σj|c(h
σ) −
  
1 − f(h
σ)
|σj|−1
 
vj − (|σi| − 1)c(h
σ)
 
=Uj(σ) − Uj(σ
′′).
Therefore, σ′′ lies in Σ2 and satisﬁes UN(σ′′) > UN(σ), in contradiction to
σ ∈ Σ3.
Hence, if σ ∈ Σ3 then (9) holds for all i ∈ N such that σi ∩ M(σ)  = ∅.
It remains to show that there exists σ ∈ Σ3 such that (9) holds for all the
players. For that, choose a player i ∈ argmink∈N ¯ vhσ
k (|σk|). If σi ∩ M(σ)  = ∅
then (9) holds for i, implying by the choice of i the correctness of (9) for
any player k ∈ N. Otherwise, if no resource of σi lies in M(σ), then let
a ∈ σi and b ∈ M(σ). Since a ∈ σi, b / ∈ σi and hσ
a = hσ
b, there exists a
player j such that b ∈ σj and a / ∈ σj. Consider the strategy proﬁle σ′ =  
σi   {a} ∪ {b},σj   {b} ∪ {a},σ−{i,j}
 
which is obtained from σ by applying
sequentially two S-moves with a and b, in opposite directions, by players i and
j. Obviously, Uk(σ′) = Uk(σ) for any k ∈ N, and therefore σ′ lies in Σ3 as well
as σ. Thus, σ′ satisﬁes (9) for player i, and therefore, for any player k ∈ N.
￿
Proof of Lemma 19: Using (8) with respect to σ, for any player k with
σ′
k = σk and for any σ′-light resource e′ ∈ σ′
k, we get ¯ ve′
k (σ′) ≥ ¯ ve′
k (σ) ≥
¯ c(he′(σ) + 1) = ¯ c(he′(σ′) + 1), as required. Now let us consider the rest of the
players. Assume σ′ is obtained by the one-step addition of resource a by player
i. In this case, i is the only player with σ′
i  = σi. The required property for
player i follows directly from Ui(σ′) > Ui(σ) and Observation 7.
In the case of a two-step addition, let σ′ =
 
σi ∪ {b},σj   {b} ∪ {a},σ−{i,j}
 
,
where b is a σ-heavy resource. Consider player i. Since Ui(σi∪{b},σ−i) > Ui(σ),
by Observation 7, ¯ vb
i(σi ∪ {b},σ−i) > ¯ c(hb(σ) + 1). Note that hb(σ) ≥ he(σ′)
for all e ∈ M and, in particular, for all σ′-light resources. Hence,
¯ v
b
i(σi ∪ {b},σ−i) > ¯ c(he′(σ) + 1) (12)
for any σ′-light resource e′. Now, since he(σ′) ≥ he(σ) for all e ∈ M and b is σ-
heavy, it follows that ¯ ve′
i(σ′) ≥ ¯ ve′
i(σ′
j {a},σ′
−j) = ¯ ve′
i
 
σi ∪ {b},σj {b},σ−{i,j}
 
≥ ¯ vb
i
 
σi ∪ {b},σj   {b},σ−{i,j}
 
= ¯ vb
i(σi∪{b},σ−i) for any σ′-light resource e′.
This, coupled with (12), yields ¯ ve′
i (σ′) > ¯ c(he′(σ′)+1) for any σ′-light resource
a, as required. For player j we just use (8) with respect to σ and the equality
hb(σ) = ha(σ′). For any σ′-light resource e′, ¯ ve′
j (σ′) = ¯ ve′
j (σ) ≥ ¯ c(he′(σ)+1) =
¯ c(he′(σ′) + 1), as required. ￿
245.2 Computation of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
We now present our next result – the CGLF-algorithm that constructs a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium in a given nondecreasing CGLF. As we previously
mentioned, the algorithm is based on Lemmas 18 and 19. It ﬁrst ﬁnds a strat-
egy proﬁle in Σ2 which is either a pure strategy Nash equilibrium or post-
addition D-stable. If it is post-addition D-stable then the algorithm applies to
it at most m − 1 one-/two-step addition operations to reach an equilibrium.
Note that the proof of Lemma 18 insures the existence of a post-addition
D-stable proﬁle in Σ3 ⊆ Σ2, the subset of proﬁles in Σ2 that maximizes the
group utility. We note though that, based on Lemma 18, the CGLF-algorithm
is designed to ﬁnd a post-addition D-stable proﬁle in Σ2, which does not nec-
essarily belong to Σ3. We start with a brief explanation of the logic behind
the algorithm, and then proceed to its detailed description.
￿ First, the algorithm determines a value k∗ = maxσ∈Σ1 hσ that represents the
common congestion on the resources for any strategy proﬁle in Σ2.
￿ To ﬁnd k∗ as above, the algorithm uses a variable k initiated with the value
k = n that gradually decreases until k∗ is found (Steps [0] – [1]).
￿ For k = n, the only even strategy proﬁle with n being its common congestion
is σ = (M,...,M), which is obviously A- and S-stable. If σ is also D-stable
then k∗ = n, and the algorithm outputs σ and halts after Step [0]. Otherwise,
k∗ < n and the algorithm proceeds with k = n − 1 (Step [1]).
￿ Given 0 < k < n, for every player i ∈ N the algorithm determines the
maximum number of resources, xi
D(k), that i would keep without dropping,
in a k-even strategy proﬁle. If
 
i∈N xi
D(k) < km then there is no k-even, D-
stable strategy proﬁle. This means that k∗ < k, and the algorithm proceeds
to the next value of k (repeating Step [1]). Otherwise, k∗ = k.
￿ If k∗ = 0 then the algorithm constructs a strategy proﬁle σ in which every
player uses precisely |σi| = xi
D(1) resources and every resource is used by at
most one player (Step [2]). As we show in the proof of Theorem 21, σ is a
Nash equilibrium.
￿ Otherwise, k∗ > 0. In this case, for every player i ∈ N the algorithm
determines the minimum number of resources, xi
A(k∗), for which i will not
apply an A-move, if the common congestion on the resources is k∗ (Step
[3]). If
 
i∈N xi
A(k∗) ≤ k∗m and xi
A(k∗) ≤ xi
D(k∗) for all i ∈ N then the
algorithm constructs a strategy proﬁle σ in which every player uses at least
xi
A(k∗) and at most xi
D(k∗) resources, and the congestion on each resource
is k∗ (Step [4]). This proﬁle is a Nash equilibrium.
￿ Otherwise, if
 
i∈N xi
A(k∗) > k∗m or ∃i ∈ N with xi
A(k∗) > xi
D(k∗), then Σ2
does not include a Nash equilibrium strategy proﬁle. In this case Lemma
18 implies the existence of a post-addition D-stable strategy proﬁle in Σ2.
For every player i ∈ N the algorithm determines the maximum number of
resources, xi(k∗), that i would keep without dropping, when the congestion
25on one of his resources is k∗ + 1 and k∗ on all the others (Step [5]). By the
existence of a post-addition D-stable proﬁle in Σ2 and by the deﬁnition of
xi(k∗), we get that
 
i∈N xi(k∗) ≥ k∗m (otherwise, such a proﬁle does not
exist). Then, the algorithm constructs a strategy proﬁle σ ∈ Σ2 in which
every player uses at most xi(k∗) resources, implying that σ is post-addition
D-stable (Step [5]). Given that, based on Lemma 19, a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium is achieved by applying at most m − 1 one-/two-step addition
operations to σ (Steps [6] – [7]).
The CGLF-algorithm is presented below.
CGLF-algorithm
Step [0] If ¯ vn
n(m − 1) ≥ ¯ c(n) then set σ := (M,...,M) and QUIT;
Otherwise set k := n − 1 and go to [1];
% if the condition holds then k∗ = n;
Step [1] For all i ∈ N set Xi
D :=
 
x ∈ {1,...,m} : ¯ vk
i (x − 1) ≥ ¯ c(k)
 
;
If Xi
D  = ∅ then set xi
D := maxx∈Xi
D x; Otherwise set xi
D := 0;
If
 
i∈N xi
D < km then set k := k − 1 and go to [2]; Otherwise go to [3];
% ﬁnding k∗ < n;
Step [2] If k = 0 then:
For i = 1 to n:
If xi
D > 0 set σi := {er ∈ M : 1 ≤ r ≤ xi
D} and reorder the resources:
for all er ∈ M set er := er+xi
D; Otherwise set σi = ∅;
QUIT;
Otherwise go to [1];
% constructing an equilibrium in the case of k∗ = 0;
Step [3] For all i ∈ N set Xi
A :=
 
x ∈ {0,...,m − 1} : ¯ vk
i (x) ≤ ¯ c(k + 1)
 
;
If Xi
A  = ∅ then set xi
A := minx∈Xi
A x; Otherwise set xi
A := m;
If
 
i∈N xi
A > km or ∃i ∈ N such that xi
A > xi
D then go to [5];
% checking the existence of a k∗-even equilibrium;
Step [4] For i = 1 to n:
Set di := km−
 i−1
j=1|σj|−
 n
j=i x
j
A, σi := {er ∈ M : 1 ≤ r ≤ min{xi
D,xi
A + di}}
and reorder the resources: for all er ∈ M set er := e(r+min{xi
D,xi
A+di})modm;
QUIT;
% constructing a k∗-even equilibrium;
Step [5] For all i ∈ N set Xi :=
 
x ∈ {1,...,m} : ¯ vk
i (x − 1) ≤ ¯ c(k + 1)
 
;
If Xi  = ∅ then set xi := maxx∈Xi x; Otherwise set xi := 0;
For i = 1 to n:
If km−
 i−1
j=1 |σj| > 0 then set σi :=
 
er ∈ M : 1 ≤ r ≤ min{xi,km −
 i−1
j=1|σj|}
 
and reorder the resources: for all er ∈ M set er := e 
r+min{xi,km−
 i−1
j=1 |σj|}
 
modm;
Otherwise set σi = ∅;
% constructing a k∗-even, post-addition D-stable proﬁle;
Step [6] For all i ∈ N, select ei ∈ argmine∈M σi he(σ);
26Set N(σ) := {i ∈ N : Ui(σ−i,σi ∪ {ei}) > Ui(σ)};
If N(σ) = ∅ then QUIT;
% checking the A-stability;
Step [7] Set M(σ) := {e ∈ M : ∃i ∈ N(σ),e = ei};
Select a∗ ∈ argmine∈M(σ) hσ
e and i∗ ∈ {i ∈ N(σ) : ei = a∗};
If a∗ is σ-light then set σi∗ := σi∗ ∪ {a∗} and go to [6];
Otherwise select a σ-light resource b∗ and j∗ ∈ {i ∈ N : a∗ ∈ σi,b∗ / ∈ σi},
set σi∗ := σi∗ ∪ {a∗}, σj∗ := (σj∗   {a∗}) ∪ {b∗}, and go to [6].
% performing a one-/two-step addition.
Theorem 21 The CGLF-algorithm ﬁnds a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in
any given nondecreasing CGLF and its time complexity is O(n2m + nm2).
Proof: First we prove that the CGLF-algorithm ﬁnds a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium in a given nondecreasing CGLF, and then proceed to the proof of
its time complexity.
Validity. Recall that Σ1 ⊆ Σ0 represents the subset of all even, D-stable
strategy proﬁles, with hσ being the common congestion on the resources for
every σ ∈ Σ1. Let k∗ represent the maximum possible common congestion on
the resources in an even, D-stable strategy proﬁle, that is in a strategy proﬁle
in Σ2. Thus, k∗ = argmaxσ∈Σ1 hσ.
￿ k∗ = n: construction of an equilibrium.
In the simplest case where
¯ v
n
n(m − 1) ≥ ¯ c(n), (13)
the CGLF-algorithm terminates after Step [0] with the outcome σ = (M,...,M),
which is obviously A- and S-stable. By Observation 7, (13) yields the D-
stability of σ. 8 Hence, k∗ = n and Lemma 8 implies that σ is a Nash equilib-
rium. Otherwise, if (13) does not hold, then k∗ < n and the algorithm proceeds
to Step [1] with k = n − 1.
￿ Finding k∗ < n.
At Step [1], for every player i ∈ N the algorithm determines the value xi
D(k)
which is the maximum integer between 1 and m satisfying ¯ vk
i (xi
D(k)−1) ≥ ¯ c(k)
(if for all x ∈ {1,...,m} we have ¯ vk
i (x − 1) < ¯ c(k) then the algorithm deter-
mines xi
D(k) = 0). Hence, by Observation 7, for any i ∈ N, xi
D(k) represents
the maximum number of resources that i would keep without dropping, in a
k-even strategy proﬁle. We note that since ¯ vk
i (x−1) decreases in x and x ≤ m,
8 Recall that, w.l.o.g., it is assumed that v1 ≥ v2 ≥ ... ≥ vn, implying in particular
that ¯ vn
1(m − 1) ≥ ¯ vn
2(m − 1) ≥ ... ≥ ¯ vn
n(m − 1). Thus, (13) yields an analogous
inequality for any player i ∈ N.
27then xi
D(k) is uniquely deﬁned and the condition ¯ vk
i (x − 1) ≥ ¯ c(k) holds for
any x < xi
D(k). If
 
i∈N xi
D(k) < km then there is no k-even, D-stable strat-
egy proﬁle. This means that k∗ < k, and the algorithm proceeds to the next
value of k (repeating Step [1]). Otherwise, k∗ = k (recall that k∗ = hσ for all
σ ∈ Σ2).
￿ k∗ = 0: construction of an equilibrium.
Consider ﬁrst the case in which
 
i∈N xi
D(k) < km for all 0 < k ≤ n−1 (Step
[1] has been repeated n−1 times). By the deﬁnition of xi
D(k), this means that
the single even, D-stable strategy proﬁle is (∅,...,∅), and any even proﬁle
with a higher congestion is not D-stable. That is, k∗ = 0. In this case, the
CGLF-algorithm terminates after Step [2]. At Step [2], the algorithm assigns
to any player i ∈ N exactly xi
D(1) lightest resources, and
 
i∈N xi
D(1) < m.
Therefore, in the resulting strategy proﬁle σ, any player i ∈ N uses precisely
|σi| = xi
D(1) resources, and every resource is used by at most one player. Below
we demonstrate that σ is a Nash equilibrium. By Lemma 8, it suﬃces to prove
the A-, D- and S-stability of σ. As we mentioned before, he(σ) ≤ 1, for all
e ∈ M. Hence, σ is a nearly-even proﬁle. Then, by Lemma 11, σ is S-stable. For
any i ∈ N, either |σi| = 0, or |σi| > 0 and ¯ v1
i(|σi|−1) = ¯ v1
i(xi
D(1)−1) ≥ ¯ c(1)
(by the deﬁnition of xi
D(1)). Hence, by Observation 7, no proﬁtable D-moves
from σ are available. In addition (again, by the deﬁnition of xi
D(1)), for any
i ∈ N, ¯ v1
i(|σi|) = ¯ v1
i (xi
D(1)) = ¯ v1
i ((xi
D(1) + 1) − 1) < ¯ c(1), implying by
Observation 7 the A-stability of σ.
￿ 0 < k∗ ≤ n − 1: checking the existence of a k∗-even equilibrium.
In the complement case, the CGLF-algorithm calculates k∗, 0 < k∗ ≤ n −
1. Recall that the fact that
 
i∈N xi
D(k∗) ≥ k∗m implies that the subset of
k∗-even, D-stable strategy proﬁles is not empty. Now, at Step [3], for every
player i ∈ N the algorithm determines a value xi
A(k∗) which is the minimum
integer between 0 and m − 1 satisfying ¯ vk∗
i (xi
A(k∗)) ≤ ¯ c(k∗ + 1) (if for all
x ∈ {0,...,m−1} we have ¯ vk∗
i (x) > ¯ c(k∗ +1) then the algorithm determines
xi
A(k∗) = m). Thus, by Observation 7, for any i ∈ N, xi
A(k∗) represents the
minimum number of resources for which i will not apply an A-move from a
k∗-even strategy proﬁle. We note that since ¯ vk∗
i (x) increases as x decreases
and since x ≥ 0, the value of xi
A(k∗) is uniquely deﬁned, and the condition
¯ vk∗
i (x) ≤ ¯ c(k∗ + 1) holds for all x > xi
A(k∗).
If xi
A(k∗) ≤ xi
D(k∗) for all i ∈ N and
 
i∈N xi
A(k∗) ≤ k∗m then, by the deﬁ-
nition of xi
A(k∗), there exists a k∗-even, A- and D-stable strategy proﬁle, and
the algorithm terminates after Step [4].
Otherwise, if
 
i∈N xi
A(k∗) > k∗m or ∃i ∈ N such that xi
A(k∗) > xi
D(k∗), then
any k∗-even, D-stable strategy proﬁle is not A-stable, and thus is not a Nash
equilibrium. In this case, Lemma 18 guarantees the existence of a k∗-even,
28post-addition D-stable strategy proﬁle, and the algorithm proceeds to Step
[5].
￿ 0 < k∗ ≤ n − 1: construction of a k∗-even equilibrium.
At Step [4], the algorithm constructs the required strategy proﬁle by assign-
ing each player at least xi
A(k∗) and at most xi
D(k∗) resources, where each
resource is assigned to exactly k∗ users. This is achieved in the following way.
For any player i, let di(k∗) = k∗m −
 i−1
j=1|σj| −
 n
j=i x
j
A(k∗). The algorithm
proceeds gradually from player 1 to player n such that player i receives |σi|
least currently congested resources, where |σi| = {xi
D(k∗),xi
A(k∗) + di(k∗)}.
That is, for player i, di(k∗) denotes the number of resources available to
him in addition to the xi
A(k∗) resources (which is the minimum number of
resources that i should keep in a k∗-even, A-stable proﬁle), such that each
player j receives at least x
j
A(k∗) resources, and the total number of assign-
ments does not exceed k∗m. Since for any i ∈ N we have xi
A(k∗) ≤ xi
D(k∗),
 
i∈N xi
D(k∗) ≥ k∗m and
 
i∈N xi
A(k∗) ≤ k∗m, then for any i we have di(k∗) ≥ 0
and xi
A(k∗) ≤ |σi| ≤ xi
D(k∗). Moreover, there exists 1 ≤ i∗ ≤ n + 1 such that
k∗m −
 i∗−1
j=1 |σj| −
 n
j=i∗ x
j
A(k∗) = 0 implying that
 
i∈N |σi| = k∗m. Also,
since player i at each step adds only the least currently congested resources,
the congestion on any resource in the resulting proﬁle is exactly k∗. That is, the
algorithm results with a k∗-even strategy proﬁle σ, in which any player i ∈ N
uses at least xi
A(k∗) and at most xi
D(k∗) resources (xi
A(k∗) ≤ |σi| ≤ xi
D(k∗)).
Since σ is even it is S-stable. In addition, by the deﬁnitions of xi
A(k∗) and
xi
D(k∗), and Observation 7, σ is A- and D-stable. Therefore, by Lemma 8, σ
is a Nash equilibrium strategy proﬁle.
￿ 0 < k∗ ≤ n − 1: construction of a k∗-even, post-addition D-stable proﬁle.
At Step [5], the algorithm constructs a k∗-even, post-addition D-stable strategy
proﬁle. For any player i ∈ N the algorithm determines a value xi(k∗) which is
the maximum integer between 1 and m satisfying ¯ vk∗
i (xi(k∗) − 1) ≥ ¯ c(k∗ +1)
(if for all x ∈ {1,...,m} we have ¯ vk∗
i (x − 1) < ¯ c(k∗ + 1) then the algorithm
determines xi(k∗) = 0). That is, by Deﬁnition 17, for any i ∈ N, xi(k∗)
represents the maximum number of resources that i would keep in a k∗-even,
post-addition D-stable strategy proﬁle. We note that since ¯ vk∗
i (x−1) decreases
in x and x ≤ m, the value of xi(k∗) is uniquely deﬁned, and the condition
¯ vk∗
i (x − 1) ≥ ¯ c(k∗ + 1) holds for all x < xi(k∗). By Lemma 18, the existence
of a proﬁle as described above implies that
 
i∈N xi(k∗) ≥ k∗m (otherwise,
such a proﬁle does not exist). Based on this, the algorithm constructs the
required proﬁle in the following way. The algorithm proceeds gradually from
player 1 to player n such that player i receives |σi| least currently congested
resources, where |σi| is the minimum between xi(k∗) and k∗m −
 i−1
j=1|σj|.
Therefore, each player i receives at most xi(k∗) resources. Moreover, since
 
i∈N xi(k∗) ≥ k∗m then for any i, k∗m −
 i−1
j=1 |σj| ≥ 0, and there exists
291 ≤ i∗ ≤ n+1 such that k∗m−
 i∗−1
j=1 |σj| = 0 implying that
 
i∈N |σi| = k∗m.
Finally, since player i at each step adds only the least currently congested
resources, in the resulting proﬁle the congestion on any resource is exactly
k∗. By the deﬁnition of xi(k∗), the resulting proﬁle is post-addition D-stable.
Moreover, ¯ vk∗
i (xi(k∗) − 1) ≥ ¯ c(k∗ + 1) yields ¯ vk∗
i (xi(k∗) − 1) ≥ ¯ c(k∗) for any
i ∈ N. Hence, by Observation 7, the above proﬁle is D-stable.
￿ The one-/two step addition dynamics and the convergence to an equilibrium.
Steps [6] – [7] describe the procedure of one- or two-step addition. The algo-
rithm halts after Step [6] if and only if the current strategy proﬁle is A-stable.
We also note that the resulting strategy proﬁle is nearly-even and hence S-
stable. Recall that the algorithm begins the ﬁrst iteration of Steps [6] – [7]
with a k∗-even, post-addition D-stable strategy proﬁle. Therefore, by Lemma
19, applying to it less than m one-/two-step addition operations, we preserve
its post-addition D-stability. Moreover, the resulting proﬁle of each iteration is
nearly-even, which, coupled with the post-addition D-stability, implies its D-
stability. Assume that the algorithm has not terminated after m−1 iterations
of [6] – [7]. Then, at the m-th iteration the algorithm produces a k∗ +1-even,
D-stable strategy proﬁle, contradicting the choice of k∗ (recall that k∗ rep-
resents the maximum possible common congestion on the resources, allowing
the D-stability of an even strategy proﬁle).
The above implies that the CGLF-algorithm terminates with a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium of a given nondecreasing CGLF.
Complexity. Step [0] takes O(1) operations and is repeated only once. Step
[1] takes O(nm) operations and can be repeated at most n times. Step [2]
takes O(nm) operations and can be repeated only once. Steps [3] – [5] take
O(nm) operations each and are performed at most once. Steps [6] – [7] take
O(nm) operations – O(nm) at Step [6] and O(n + m) at Step [7] – and can
be repeated at most m times. Therefore, the complexity of CGLF-algorithm
is O(n2m + nm2). ￿
6 CGLFs with observable resource failures
In the CGLF-model discussed above, a player is required to pay for any re-
source he uses, regardless of its success or failure. Such a scenario, for example,
may take place when the success or the failure of every resource cannot be
observed but only the success or the failure of the player’s task can be de-
tected. This model can be modiﬁed to describe situations in which the success
or failure of each resource can be detected, and the players are required to pay
only for the non-faulty resources they selected. Both models are reasonable
and worthwhile studying. It turns out that the two models hold similar results,
30as described in the sequel.
The expected utility for a player in the modiﬁed model with observable re-
source failures can be written as follows:
Ui(σ)=
 
1 −
 
e∈σi
f(he(σ))
 
vi −
 
e∈σi
c(he(σ))(1 − f(he(σ)))
=
 
1 −
 
e∈σi
f(he(σ))
 
vi −
 
e∈σi
c
′(he(σ)),
where c′( ) = c( )(1 − f( )) is the modiﬁed cost function. Thus, the modiﬁed
model can be viewed as a special case of the CGLF-model we discussed be-
fore. Therefore, all the results we obtained for CGLFs are valid in this case as
well, with respect to the modiﬁed cost function. In particular, there is a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium whenever c′( ) is nondecreasing.
However, the fact that the original cost function, c( ), is nondecreasing does
not imply that the modiﬁed cost function, c′( ), is nondecreasing; hence, the
modiﬁed CGLF with nondecreasing costs is not a special case of the original
nondecreasing CGLF. One may notice though that c( ) =
c′( )
1−f( ) = ¯ c′ (recall
our notation following Lemma 14). Therefore, if c( ) is nondecreasing then so
is ¯ c′( ). This implies that the technical approach we proposed in this paper
to prove the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in CGLFs with
unobservable resource failures (which uses the monotonicity of ¯ c( ) rather than
that of c( )) 9 is applicable to the case of observable failures as well. Since the
proof techniques in this case are similar to those we used earlier, the detailed
proofs are omitted from this paper.
7 Summary and future work
In this paper, we introduced and studied congestion settings with unreliable
resources, where the resource failure probability depends on the congestion
experienced by the resource. We deﬁned a class of congestion games with
load-dependent failures (CGLFs). In contrast with the work on CGFs (Penn
et al. (2005)) where the players care about delays and therefore consider the
minimum delay of their selected resources, in CGLFs players care about their
proﬁts, and therefore the model is additive with respect to the cost of the
selected resources, as in classical congestion games. In a CGLF, a player aims
to maximize the diﬀerence between his expected beneﬁt from a successful task
completion and the sum of costs over the resources he uses. We have studied
9 See Remark 15.
31the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium and the existence of a poten-
tial function in the presented class of games. We showed that these games do
not, in general, possess pure strategy equilibria. Nevertheless, if the resource
cost functions are nondecreasing then such an equilibrium is guaranteed to
exist, despite the non-existence of a potential function. We presented an eﬃ-
cient algorithm for constructing a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in CGLFs
with nondecreasing costs.
The aim of this work was to initiate the study of CGLFs, which we believe
to be a realistic model, capturing basic phenomena in e.g. the service indus-
tries. In future research we plan to consider various extensions of CGLFs. In
particular, we wish to consider the more general situation where resources are
not identical, and players are restricted and diﬀer in the subsets of resources
they may use. In addition, it is of interest to discuss the question of the ex-
istence of an ordinal potential function in CGLFs, stability under deviations
by coalitions and social (in)eﬃciency of equilibria in CGLFs.
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